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Pain as Yardstick 
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Ilit Ferber 
Tel-Aviv University 
One of the best known and most widely accepted premises regarding the 
experience of pain and suffering is its singular, private nature. Pain’s 
violence isolates us from everything else, embedding us completely within 
our own suffering so that there is nothing else but pain: no world or objects, 
no relationship with other people, no past or anticipation of the future. An 
utter withdrawal. But pain’s isolating force is dual: it affects not only those 
who suffer, but also those who are not in pain. Thus, it is precisely in pain – 
the exemplary state in which we need others with us to offer their help and 
sympathy – that we find ourselves in solitude; and it is precisely in the state 
of pain that we leave others to suffer alone. Elaine Scarry famously 
addresses this problem when she ascribes to pain what she calls its 
“unsharability”. Using geographical metaphors of distance, Scarry compares 
our relation to the pain of others to the “character of some deep 
subterranean fact, belonging to an invisible geography […] the pains 
occurring in other people's bodies flicker before the mind, then disappear.”1 
Even more distinctive in Scarry's account is her description of pain as 
an active form of agency, as if it were attacking us and purposefully acting 
upon us with its fearful destructive force.2 In her view, extreme physical 
pain triumphs over the suffering subject byvirtue of its unmatched ability to 
tear up a gaping rift between the sufferer and the rest of humanity. I would 
like to question this prevailing hypothesis regarding the unsharable, private 
nature of pain, which has become an almost obligatory reference point in 
discussions of pain, and suggest a different perspective. Although the nature 
of violence entails that it is necessarily exercised on an individual’s singular, 
private, and secluded body or soul, its effects extend far beyond this 
immediate impact. Thus pain’s private nature is not only not its central 
problematic but, moreover, the focus on privacy obscures what I take to be 
the substratum of the experience of pain and violence: namely, the unique 
way it alters the world via the new, stark yardstick it imposes on it. It is, 
however, not only the sufferer’s world that is remolded at its very core, but 
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our world as well. I will present my argument through a close reading of 
Jean Améry’s account of his experiences of torture and imprisonment by the 
Nazis between 1943 and 1945 in his At the Mind’s Limits.3 
Améry’s writings present us with a strange perplexity. They are 
directly and explicitly based on his personal experiences, providing us with 
rare insights into the torture he suffered as well as its effects throughout his 
later life. And yet the unique character of Améry’s writings confronts the 
reader with an unexpected, even destabilizing experience. Though rooted in 
autobiography, his writings are conveyed to the reader in an almost distant 
or cold tone, as if emerging from someone whose cry of pain is so forceful 
that it breaks all given orders before almost immediately suffocating itself 
and falling silent. Sebald’s description of Améry’s singular style is especially 
astute: “he often expressed only in qualified or very restrained terms. […] as 
if every fragment of memory touched a sore point, as if he were compelled 
to ward off everything immediately and translate it into reflective form to 
make it at all measurable by any standard. […] Améry found it in the open 
method of the essay genre, where he conveyed both the damaged emotions 
of a man brought to the brink of death and the supremacy of a mind intent 
on thinking freely even in extremis, however useless doing so might seem.”4 
These writings, lacking even a shred of self-pity, never adopt a 
traumatized voice regarding the terrible experiences Améry has endured. It 
is thus very hard to find the pathos that we tend to look for in memoirs of 
Holocaust survivors. “If one speaks about torture, one must take care not to 
exaggerate,” he writes, “What was inflicted on me in the unspeakable vault 
in Breendonk was by far not the worst form of torture.”5 .This is only one 
example of what can be described as a typical tone of “understatement,” to 
use Sebald’s formulation – instead of inviting identification or empathy, 
Améry positions us before him, the tortured, reporting all the details in the 
first person, and nevertheless asks that we not be shocked, not feel pity. His 
descriptions of pain are thus extricated from the private, autobiographical 
context: “the horrible can make no claim to singularity.”.6 Améry 
persistently distances his account from the personal, traumatic tone one 
might expect to encounter and makes a point of challenging the label of the 
“pathological,” which we all too frequently use in the face of those testifying 
to their horrible experiences, thus providing ourselves with an all-too-easy 
target for our pity and commiseration. Améry never grants us this 
opportunity to escape. It is specifically his almost dry tone that keeps us so 
close to him, precluding any form of withdrawal. 
 Améry makes a point of telling us something about violence as such, 
rather than about the specific violence (no matter how terrible) that he 
endured. He calls us to resist our customary inclination to think of violence 
only from the victim’s perspective—that is, as an aggressive force exerted on 
an individual’s body or spirit—and to give up our instinctive embrace of 
identification with (or denial of) the victim’s suffering.7 There is, of course, 
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no doubt that Améry experienced, in his own flesh, the terrible isolation 
inherent in the pain and segregation of torture, but despite this utterly 
personal experience, despite Améry’s body and soul being at stake, he stages 
the scene, from the first moment, as an encounter that occurs in the public 
sphere, in the world and not opposite it. The uniqueness of Améry’s 
suspension of intimacy when describing his experience is what allows him 
to speak about the horror precisely as what is never private or singular, 
never belonging only to the one whose body is the very body hanging 
upside down from his wrists, tied to an iron hook in the ceiling.8 Violence, 
rather, exposes something about all of us and is therefore revealed to us all 
at the same time; what it demolishes is therefore not limited to the confines 
of a single body or mind. It shatters us all. 
 
“the first blow” 
There is a moment when an act of violence transcends the confines of the 
body as well as the suffering of the individual and becomes, in an instant, 
the founding and constitutive principle of human existence as such; from 
this moment on, one can no longer rise above the space of violence, 
transcend its affect. Améry describes this moment as that of “the first blow,” 
a phrase that appears as often as ten times in the course of only three pages 
in Torture.9 Although “the first blow” is a physical one, its affect extends 
beyond the body and the terrible pain it endures. The first blow has a 
disclosive quality: it “brings home to the prisoner that he is helpless, and thus 
it already contains in the bud everything that is to come.”10Améry’s 
emphasis here is not limited merely to the knowledge of the act of violence 
or torture that is endured – the blow reveals to the prisoner something about 
his or her world and the potentialities inherent in its future. The “first blow” 
reveals that the brutal aggressive act strikes not only the physical body but 
every possible framework within which it exists – world, time, others – and 
shatters “the axes of its traditional frames of reference.”11 All forms of 
theoretical knowledge or prediction become “real possibilities, yes, […] 
certainties.”12. There is no process in which values and principles slowly 
deteriorate, no advancing “sickness” of a slowly crumbling mind, 
unconsciously losing everything that kept it together. The force of torture 
appears, instead, in a brutal instant, a flash, from which there is no return or 
moreover, any possibility of transcendence. The violent act not only violates 
the body (or soul), injuring it and piercing through its covering of protective 
skin; such an act obliterates the very possibility that it might ever be 
overcome or transcended. From this instant onward, from the moment of the 
“first blow,” violence becomes our only possible yardstick. Now everything 
can only be measured against it, in and on its own terms. There is no longer 
causality, logic, or trust – only pain. 
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At the beginning of the 1940s, Améry was a member of the Belgian 
resistance and took part in relatively minor activities such as the distribution 
of anti-Nazi propaganda to Nazi soldiers. He recounts being familiar with 
the testimonies and news regarding the possible dangers that would await 
him were he to be captured, and he recalls that he did not in any way object 
to being subject to such a bitter fate, thinking that “there could be nothing 
new” for him. Everything was expected: “Prison, interrogation, blows, 
torture; in the end, most probably death. Thus it was written and thus it 
would happen.”13 Very soon, however, Améry discovers that these details, 
which informed his sense of anticipation, were only remotely connected to 
what, indeed, he would go on to experience. This is clearly not because 
Améry did not hold all the relevant information or that it was inaccurate, 
but because the sphere dominated by violence is entirely different from the 
realm ofinformation, data or even testimony:  
That someone is carried away shackled in an auto is ‘self-evident’ 
only when you read about it in the newspaper and you rationally 
tell yourself […] well of course, and what more? It can and it will 
happen like that to me someday, too. But the auto is different, and 
the pressure of the shackles was not felt in advance, and the streets 
are strange, and although you may previously have walked by the 
gate of the Gestapo headquarters countless times, it has other 
perspectives, other ornaments […] when you cross its threshold as 
a prisoner. Everything is self-evident, and nothing is self-evident as 
soon as we are thrust into a reality whose light blinds us and burns 
us to the bone.14 
This essential gap is the nucleus of Améry’s story. His account does not 
concern the inherent gap between reality and our conception of it, nor the 
chasm separating reality and imagination – these types of divergences had 
been discussed in the history of philosophy for centuries. Nor is it about a 
veil covering a horrendous abyss, a veil that is suddenly lifted. No. 
Something else takes place here. It is the act of violence itself that opens up 
this gap, and it is that painful “first blow” descending on Améry that 
forcibly tears apart the all-too-delicate fabric of our human existence, of 
what connects us to other human beings and to the world we share with 
them. This sudden tear begins with a confined event taking place on a single 
body in one specific cellar. It is, at first, almost invisible and does not yet 
threaten the strength and solidity of the entire fabric. Very soon, however, 
this small tear (and this is how small tears are) widens, expands, and, all too 
soon, impairs our very stability and wholeness, and hinders us from 
restoring them. This is a metaphor for what Améry calls the collapse of our 
trust in the world which abruptly breaks down, is shattered and “will not be 
regained.”15  
In his book’s final essay, Améry describes a cerain distrust and what 
he there describes as “unrest” that differentiates him from other people. This 
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is, however, not a metaphysical unrest but rather markedly physical and 
social in nature. It is society that robbed him of his trust in the world and not 
some metaphysical idea such as Being, Nothingness, God or the Absence 
thereof.16 For Améry, there is an unspoken, almost invisible certainty that 
exists in the social bond and our commitment to one another, which keeps 
us together as a collective human entity. Trust, gradually grows out of our 
life experience, is carefully pieced together from many fragments of memory 
and feeling: the mother soothing her pained child or the doctor who 
prescribes the medicine that provides relief:17 our “trust in the world” is 
founded on our certainty (closer to belief than to knowledge) that others 
possess goodness and will respect our boundaries, that our existence matters 
to them. “In almost all situations in life,” Améry explains, “where there is 
bodily injury there is also the expectation of help; the former is compensated 
by the latter.”18 Even if others hurt us, we have this unconscious yet 
profound belief that we have all assented to the same social contract, 
unspoken yet strong, according to which justice ultimately regulates itself. 
Bernstein interprets this in terms of invisibility and argues that trust is most 
fully actualized and felt when it is unnoticed, invisible. Consequently, “the 
ethical foundation of everyday life is a set of attitudes, presuppositions, and 
practices which we typically fail to emphatically notice until they become 
absent.”19 It is in its collapse that we come to notice trust, albeit only when it 
appears in the form of distrust. There is then “a movement from the 
invisibility of trust to its appearance as unjustified, thus leading to 
distrust.”20 
The invisible certainty of trust, however, buckles and breaks into 
pieces when the other violates us, when there is nothing we can do to rectify 
this violation of our borders. Améry’s use of the term “border” here has a 
dual significance: First, the other human being who uses violent force to 
cause me pain collapses, with his very hands, the delicately balanced border 
that separates our bodies. Second, with this very strike another border 
emerges, and this time it is not delicate but fierce, thick. This is the wall that 
stands between my own vulnerability and suffering on one side, and the 
belief that the world, or at least someone in it, will come to my rescue on the 
other. The collapse of one border, therefore, instantly causes another to be 
erected. But this second wall is strong and threatening and, more 
importantly, it will not be so easy to tear down.21 
 
the impossible 
In Améry’s discussion of trust, the invisible is transformed into the impossible. 
The appearance of distrust is relentlessly entangled with its own 
impossibility, always marked by its self-negation. Thus in the peculiar 
dialectic of violence and suffering, the violent event of torture not only 
opens up an unbridgeable gap at the heart of human existence. What’s more, 
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it possesses the power to constitute a new mode of existence or 
consciousness that is paradoxical, or even a-logical, in nature. Broken trust is 
a hallmark of the paradox: the torturer is no doubt human but at the same 
time he is an animal; the tortured prisoner is similarly, at once human and 
animal; reality is abstract yet material at its core; the world is possible and 
yet, strikingly impossible.  
The description of the intellectual’s life in the camps in At the Mind’s 
Limits exemplifies this paradoxical structure: the camp represents not only 
an inversion of the social world or even of trust – it is a violent undermining 
of everything that had been, until that moment, the logical foundation of 
existence as such: “You always had to be clean-shaven, but it was strictly 
forbidden to possess razor or scissors […] On threat of punishment no 
button could be missing on the striped inmate suit, but if you lost one at 
work, which was unavoidable, there was practically no chance to replace it. 
You had to be strong, but you were systematically weakened.”22 The norms 
and seemingly unshakeable rules of logic, causality, induction, and social 
structure – so solid in our daily lives, so certain that we move through them 
and hardly notice them – were not merely broken but shattered. After the 
collapse of his initial resistance, the intellectual has recognized that “what 
may not be, very well could be,” and he understood that the utterly 
impossible, the illogical and paradoxical proved to be starkly possible, 
asserting itself powerfully in a clear, stable, and consistent manner, just like 
the logic of the outside world.23 It is evidently impossible to live in accord 
with such a paradoxical perception of reality, which can be described as 
psychotic, and this not only because it embodies the lack of trust that Améry 
develops, but since it blocks every possibility of continuity or even mere 
confidence in the simplest rules of logic. The implications of such a 
disposition of consciousness lie in the collapse of the ability to predict the 
future by relying on experience. 
Up until the “first blow” the tortured individual lived in a world that 
was believed to be founded on basic social solidarity.  This has changed after 
the “first blow,” but not because the tortured man discovered that evil exists 
or now knows something he didn’t before. The change has to do with his 
acknowledgment that there is a possibility, even if slight, that things are not 
as he believed them to be, not as they should be, and finally: not as they 
were. The psychotic element here has to do with the fact that even if one 
knows  he is protected, his predator is behind bars or dead and no one will 
ever turn him into an animal again; Even then, there is still the slightest 
possibility that this would happen. Although the war is over and the horror 
has ended—it has, in fact, never ceased and is always recurring: “Whoever 
was tortured, stays tortured,” Améry famously writes, “It was over for a 
while. It still is not over […] In such an instance there is no ‘repression.’ 
Does one repress an unsightly birthmark?”24  
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Primo Levi gives an interesting account of this persistent feeling of 
doubt that is accompanied by the suffocating recurrence of the impossible, 
when he describes a recurring dream he had after the war was over. In the 
dream, he is peacefully sitting at the dinner table with his family or friends, 
and yet, although no threat is in sight, he has a clear feeling of distress. Levi 
continues: “And, in fact, as the dream continues, bit by bit or all of a sudden 
– each time it’s different – everything falls apart around me, the setting, the 
walls, the people. The anguish becomes more intense and pronounced. 
Everything is now in chaos. […] at once I know what it means, I know that 
I’ve always known it: I am once again in the camp, and nothing outside the 
camp was true. The rest – family, flowering nature, home – was a brief 
respite, a trick of the senses.”25 What figures so powerful in Levi’s 
description is his binding of the completely unexpected (the falling apart of 
intimacy, family and security) with that which he always knew was true, 
lurking there (“I know what it means, I know that I’ve always known it”). 
The possibility that the most concrete, solid feeling of life and world is, in 
fact, a dream, would seem to be utterly impossible. Yet, after the first blow, 
it becomes a possibility and will always remain so. 
Pain and violence are obviously a part of our world and of the flesh of 
our humanity – and yet it is impossible for such experiences to take part in 
our world. This paradoxical essence of violence is why we cannot treat the 
violent act as a merely “non-human” act standing outside the borders of 
what we take to be human. It is here, right here; yet when it emerges, 
violence appears before us as something whose presence we cannot possibly 
bear. Violence is human and in-human at the same time – a part of our very 
world, yet impossibly part of it. Violence appears, therefore, together with 
the impossibility of its appearance. It is baldly present, yet its presence is 
unbearable. This is a stark demonstration that the certainty usually attached 
to the experience of violence and pain is only one side of the story. Being a 
victim of a violent act, at the same time (and perhaps to a greater extent), 
testifies to a strong doubt, to extreme skepticism: it is me standing here, in 
my own, familiar world, 1+1=2, and yet, perhaps none of this is true. 
Skepticism as a philosophical stance makes a point of not being merely 
immersed in the everyday, unconsciously floating with its currents, butstops 
short at the unquestionable, to doubt, to put oneself in a position that is 
farthest as can be from the realm of the evident. The victim of torture, on the 
other hand, does not choose his doubt; he is violently forced into the 
impossibility of skepticism, together with the ever-present possibility that 
this is all a dream. 
Améry’s account of the twisted, distorted sense of temporality 
characteristic of resentment epitomizes the case in which suffering affects 
not only the body of its individual victim but transforms the structure of 
time itself. He draws a distinction between what Améry refers to as the 
natural and moral modalities of time, the first belonging to forgiveness, the 
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latter to resentment. Those who forgive do so “lazily and cheaply,” he 
writes, subjugating themselves to the sentiment that time heals all wounds, 
and turn themselves to the future which Améry describes as the “genuine 
human dimension.”26 Those who are filled with resentment, experience 
temporality entirely differently: time, ceasing to be biological and social, has 
moved into the moral sphere (Resentment: 71). Améry uses a very critical, 
even scornful tone when speaking of those who believe in the natural power 
of the passing of time, modeled on the physiological processes of wound-
healing. For him, human beings are distinguished precisely by their ability 
to struggle against the passing of time, resentment being the tenacious yet 
hopeless revolt against time’s passage and its natural, corrective effects.27 
According to Ben Shai’s interpretation of Améry’s disordered 
temporality, which he takes to be the leitmotif of At the Mind’s Limits as a 
whole, the twisted sense of time belongs to a higher order that has, in 
Améry’s view, “something deeply instructive, and in that sense privileging, 
about it. This has to do with the claim that only when subjected to such 
inhuman condition do we come face to face with a fundamental truth about 
the human condition itself.”28 I find this claim to be a crucial element in 
Améry’s insistent attempts to release his account of suffering from the 
subjective or psychological spheres. In this context, his resolute struggle 
with what he calls natural time, in favor of moral time, is not an attempt to 
overcome suffering, but rather “to preserve its negative effects while 
elevating it to the place of public concern, insight and knowledge.”29 
Extreme suffering has the quality of opening up and disclosing that which 
those who forgive and those who believe in the healing powers of time’s 
natural course fail to see. The suffering of torture puts the victim in a limbo 
where no experience is reliable, no trust possible; yet at the same time, it 
possesses the singular power to uncover the illogical, twisted infrastructure 
of the core of human existence. 
Maurice Blanchot’s provocative remarks on suffering and temporality 
are illuminating in this context. In the first part of The Infinite Conversation, 
he describes the experience of suffering as that of a deliverance to a starkly 
different temporal realm: “to time as other, as absence and neutrality; 
precisely to a time that can no longer redeem us, that constitutes no 
recourse. A time without event, without project, without possibility; not that 
pure immobile instant, the spark of the mystics, but an unstable perpetuity 
in which we are arrested and incapable of permanence, a time neither 
abiding nor granting the simplicity of a dwelling place.”30 I find Blanchot’s 
argument here to be in close kinship with Améry’s: both emphasize that the 
unique, twisted temporality of suffering is very far from being its mere 
negation. It is not an “outside” of time or its simple arrest by way of an 
obsessive recurrence of the past (with this claim, both distance themselves 
from the framework of the traumatic). Suffering’s temporality allows no 
relationship to a future or to any form of projection, since these are 
I l i t  F e r b e r  |  1 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.784 
conditioned by a distance that is impossible for the tortured, who is 
“crucified” to his suffering in Améry’s account. For Blanchot, the experience 
of suffering is the paragon of the co-existence of necessity and impossibility; 
suffering “makes time a present without future and yet impossible as 
present […] affliction makes us lose time and makes us lose the world […] It 
is life become alien and death become inaccessible. It is the horror of being 
where being is without end.”31 
 
birthmark 
It is for this reason that the “first blow” is not merely physical and is not 
only felt on the individual body of the tortured; it is a “blow” to the rules of 
logic and to trust, to the possibility of deduction and the natural confidence 
in our past experiences. After the first blow, there is and always will be the 
possibility that everything will fall apart. No induction or logic will be of 
help here since we have learned, on our own flesh, that nothing is certain 
and that anything, no matter how illogical, can indeed occur. For Améry, 
therefore, every day is like the first and the last: “Every day anew I lose my 
trust in the world.”32 This is his scar, his birthmark.33 
The force of Améry’s writing lies, as I insist here, in its assertion that 
the pathological, skeptic and distrustful forms of existence do not belong to 
him alone. The scar is not embossed only on his body; it becomes the plight 
of all of us, not only those who were hung upside-down from their wrists in 
a cellar somewhere, but also of those who were not, and almost certainly 
will never be. Therein lies the heart of my argument: Améry leads us into his 
own psychosis and there is no way out, not for him and not for us. He shows 
us that this is not a pathology or neurosis, but rather, an irrefutable truth, a 
reality: “The others are the madmen, and I am left standing around 
helplessly among them, a fully sane person who joined a tour through a 
psychiatric clinic and suddenly lost sight of the doctors and orderlies.”34 We 
are now with him, sharing his unavoidable doubt that the world might not 
always respond to our expectations (of logic, causality, society). We 
understand that such a possibility exists; whether it will ever be actualized is 
irrelevant. Insofar as we are part of the same world, we also and inevitably 
take part in the same possibility that it may collapse.  
The uniqueness of Améry’s writings among survivor memoirs lies in 
his ability to express the twofold, and tragic, nature of violence. The 
autobiographical experience, private traumatic memory and the survivor’s 
terrible testimony are put forth together with (but not at the expense of) 
Améry’s ability to describe the experience of pain and violence as what 
essentially transcends the private, subjective realm. This is one of the reasons 
for my decision not to incorporate any detailed descriptions of pain and 
violence here (although Améry did write such descriptions, and they are 
sometimes graphic). I suggest that we read Améry as follows: the singular, 
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tortured, suffering victim does not appear as the sole protagonist occupying 
the stage, offering his lacered body as an object of our pity (victim vis-à-vis 
witnesses). The description of the specificity of torture, therefore, does not 
preclude our grasping the universal implications of pain and violence. On 
the contrary – and here lies Améry’s greatness – the personal conditions the 
universal, allows it to appear and to do so with such starkness. It is not, of 
course, my intention here to undermine or underestimate the suffering and 
cruelty of the single blow to a specific body; each act of this nature deeply 
breaks the body and soul of its victim. However – and this cannot be stated 
too emphatically – the echoes of the blow always resound far, very far, from 
a particular originating body or event. Despite the specificity of its affliction 
(it always has to be directed towards someone or something), violence hits, 
with all its force, everything that is human, breaking what makes up our 
world into pieces. 
This image of pain, in which the suffering of a single individual 
necessarily and immediately touches all of humanity, in which a single 
strike in a dark cellar forces an irreparable tear into humanity’s fabric, might 
sound like an exemplary, not to say ideal, portrayal of humanity. This 
description, however, fails to grasp the reality in which this fabric has long 
been worn out and tattered from acts committed in cellars, from countless 
blows and humiliations, and it is now slit and shredded throughout. This is 
why, according to Améry, “Whoever has succumbed to torture can no 
longer feel at home in the world” (Torture, 40). It is here that his crystal-clear 
writing is transformed: from prose expressed in a poised voice to a series of 
sad, cracked wails from someone who feels that he is utterly and deeply 
incurable.  
This metamorphosis happens not because he himself cannot obliterate 
the horror, and not because he bears terrible, almost physical memories of 
his own pain that will never, he now grasps, go away. The reason lies 
elsewhere, perhaps in an unexpected place: it emerges when the tortured 
takes leave of the dark cellar and re-enters the human world that, 
surprisingly to him, still goes about its daily business:  
My neighbor greets me in a friendly fashion, Bonjour, Monsieur; I 
doff my hat, Bonjour, Madame. But Madame and Monsieur are 
separated by interstellar distances; for yesterday a Madame looked 
away when they led off a Monsieur, and through the barred 
windows of the departing car a Monsieur viewed a Madame as if 
she were a stone angel from a bright and stern heaven […] Bonjour, 
Madame, Bonjour, Monsieur, they greet each other. But she cannot 
and will not relieve her sick neighbor of his mortal illness at the 
cost of suffering to death from it herself. And so they remain 
strangers to one another […] Thus I am alone, as I was when they 
tortured me.35 
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The transformation occurs outside the cellar, in the world that, Améry now 
realizes, can truly and utterly erase its own history. When the torture is over 
and its suffering has ended, when the wounds have healed and the tortured 
body exits the cellar and ventures back into the world – then he sees that 
everything has changed, and yet nothing has changed. 
The sturdy dividing wall, which rose up in place of the vulnerable 
border of human trust that had collapsed with the first blow, now marks a 
thin, almost invisible, but impenetrable line. It separates those whose bodies 
were subject to violence and unbearable pain, and those who were not 
touched by its hand.36 This sounds close to Scarry’s famous claim that pain 
achieves its triumph over us by means of what she calls its “unsharability,” 
the essential characteristic of what cannot be communicated, shared, and 
known by others. Although some of Améry’s formulations are similar to 
those of Scarry, their accounts differs in important ways. Améry makes clear 
that although there might be an essential separation between the tortured 
and those who were spared, we are all part of the same world, a world that 
is now wholly altered, for all of us, from the moment of the first blow. My 
argument here is that unlike Scarry, for Améry the rift exists within the 
world itself and therefore belongs to us all. We might never have to cross 
over to the side of suffering: however, we can never ignore the unbridgeable 
gap that now exists, and will never cease to exist, in our shared world. 
Améry has, in other words, made us part of his incurable, tattooed suffering, 
precisely because we exist on its other side—for how can we, too, “repress an 
unsightly birthmark?”37 
What, then, does Améry leave us with? Should we be satisfied with 
his testimony about the unbridgeable gap between himself and us? Between 
the pained, suffering ones and those who can only regard such pain from 
afar? Should we remain aloof from such a dispiriting conclusion? Or should 
we, perhaps, aspire to the impossible, that is, to the complete and utter 
identification with the suffering of others, or to the desperate attempt to cure 
and repair? Clearly, no: such attempts are doomed to be sentimental, 
moralistic, or simply impossible (since even the deepest, most committed 
identification would never turn us into those who were hung, from their 
own wrists, upside down from a cellar’s ceiling). Perhaps we have to settle 
for a diminished possibility, the only one we still have, and acknowledge 
that the only response that remains at our disposal is to feel this gap, to 
acknowledge that we cannot, principally, take part in the suffering of others, 
nor can we mend it. Perhaps this “thin” acknowledgement is what will be 
our own “portion” of pain. Pain stemming from the fact that none of us and 
not only Améry, can ever really feel at home in our world. 
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